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Creativity as a Matter of Choice:
Prior Experience and Task Instruction
as Boundary Conditions for the
Positive Effect of Choice on Creativity
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the effects of prior experience, task instruction, and
choice on creative performance. Although extant research suggests that giving
people choice in how they approach a task could enhance creative performance,
we propose that this view needs to be circumscribed.
Specifically, we argue that when choice is administered during problem solv-
ing by varying the number of available resources, the high combinatorial flexibil-
ity conferred by a large choice set of resources can be overwhelming. Through
two experiments, we found that only individuals with high prior experience in the
task domain and given explicit instruction to be creative produced more creative
outcomes when given more choice. When either of these two conditions is not
met (i.e., low prior experience or given non-creativity instruction), more choice
did not lead to more creative performance. Theoretical and practical implications
of these findings are discussed.
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“Invention consists in avoiding the constructing of useless combinations
and in constructing the useful combinations which are in infinite
minority. To invent is to discern, to choose.”
Henri Poincare (1854-1912)
French mathematician and theoretical scientist
INTRODUCTION
“To invent is to discern, to choose.” These words of Henri Poincare highlight an
important feature of the creativity process. In many human domains, to be
creative is not about creating an entity out of thin air (Campbell, 1960; Simonton,
1999a; 1999b). Rather, the creativity process involves combining existing ideas
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and resources into something new and useful (e.g., Baughman & Mumford, 1995;
Mobley, Doares, & Mumford, 1992; Hofstadter, 1985; Koestler, 1964). In more
precise terms, according to the Darwinian perspective of creativity (Campbell,
1960), the creativity process involves the two steps of variation and selection. In
the variation step, existing ideas or resources are subject to recombination and
“mutation” to derive new ones. These new variants of ideas or products are then
subject to the creator’s judgment. Only those that best address the problem
at hand are selected for implementation. Inherent in this process is the need
to contemplate and choose from among the myriad possible combinations. For
instance, a chef has to choose from among different ways of combining a set of
ingredients when creating a new dish. Similarly, a painter has to choose from
among different ways of integrating a set of colors and images when creating a
new masterpiece.
Of the two steps in the Darwinian model of creativity, the variation step is espe-
cially crucial to the generation of a creative outcome. In particular, the more com-
binations one can generate from the initial elements, the higher the chance that a
new and useful product will emerge (Simonton, 1999b, p. 86). The larger the
choice set of initial elements, the more flexibility there is in the generation of
different combinations. This gives rise to a richer set of potential solutions from
which one can later choose. For example, when a chef is given 10 possible ingre-
dients from which to create a new dish, he or she will have greater combinatorial
flexibility than when given just three ingredients. Such higher degree of flexibility
will give the chef more potential solutions to choose from, thereby increasing his
or her chance of producing something creative (Simonton, 1999a, 1999b). Thus,
one would expect a positive relationship between creative performance and the
size of the choice set of initial resources that one can choose from to generate
possible solutions.
However, the process of contemplating and choosing from among a large set
of combinatorial possibilities is not a simple one. This process becomes even
more complex and difficult when the number of initial elements from which the
potential solutions can be derived increases. While a master chef or painter
may welcome the freedom and flexibility associated with an enlarged set of
options, how does an average person fare given such complexity? Does giving
people more choice during problem solving1 necessarily lead to more creative
performance? In this research, we investigate the circumstances under which the
average person will produce creative outputs when given a large (versus small)
choice set of initial resources during creative problem solving. Specifically, we
examine both person (prior experience in task domain) and situational (type of
task instruction) factors as boundary conditions for the positive effect of choice
on creative performance to occur. In the ensuing paragraphs, we first review some
relevant literature before developing our hypothesis.
1 We use the term “problem solving” broadly to denote not just the seeking of resolutions to problems,
but also the accomplishment of tasks that involve creativity.
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CHOICE AND CREATIVE PERFORMANCE
In contemporary creativity research, task flexibility has received considerable
research attention and empirical support as an important situational factor that
could influence human creativity. A large number of studies have demonstrated
that creativity is enhanced when individuals are given flexibility in their work (e.g.,
Amabile, 1983; Smelt & Cross, 1984; Amabile & Gitomer, 1984; Amabile &
Gryskiewicz, 1987, 1989; Witt & Beorkrem,1989; Shalley, 1991; Greenberg, 1992;
Zhou, 1998). Among the many approaches in giving people task flexibility (e.g.,
giving people freedom in the sequence they complete a task, Shalley, 1991), the
most simple and direct approach is through the provision of choice (Amabile &
Gitomer,1984; Greenberg, 1992). For instance, Amabile and Gitomer (1984) found
that children who were given choice in terms of which task materials to use in
creating a collage, produced collages which were assessed to be more creative
than those produced by children who were given no choice. Similarly, Greenberg
(1992) found that subjects who had choice in selecting which problems to work
on in a given task situation produced more creative outputs. The main psycho-
logical mechanism that underlies these findings is that choice confers self-
determination and intrinsic motivation — key ingredients for creative performance
(e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985; Deci, 1975; Deci, 1981; Amabile, 1983,1988, 1990).
However, past research that used choice as a way of providing task flexibility
focused mainly on either giving people choice versus no choice during problem
selection. Thus, it is unclear whether giving people more choice of resources
during problem solving would necessarily lead to more creativity. In the current
research, we move beyond the choice versus no choice manipulation and study
the effect of the extent of choice given to people during problem solving. Spe-
cifically, we investigate the effect of the number of initial resources given to people
on creative performance. This, in our view, constitutes yet another way to which
task flexibility could be manifested in real life contexts. For instance, as illustrated
by our example in the introduction, a chef may encounter a large versus small
choice set of ingredients. In such a problem paradigm, the combinatorial flexibil-
ity that the problem solver has in generating potential solutions is positively
related to the size of the choice set of given resources.
However, past research has also illustrated that selection, evaluation, and inte-
gration of information are affected by the number of options available. As the
complexity of information processing increases, people tend to simplify their
decision-making processes by relying on simple heuristics (Payne, 1982;
Timmermans, 1993; Wright, 1975). For instance, in a study that examines the
decision strategies of people encountering different number of alternatives,
Timmermans (1993) found that as the number of alternatives increases, people
were not only more likely to use an elimination strategy, they also made use of
less information. More recently, studies by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found evi-
dence that people’s ability to contemplate multiple combinations of solutions
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may be limited as the number of options increases. These findings suggest that
giving people a large number of options in a problem solving task can lead to
information overload. In addition, recent choice research has also demonstrated
that the provision of extensive choice can have detrimental consequences emo-
tionally (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). For instance, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found
that people given extensive choice reported more difficulty and frustration during
the decision making process.
Extending these findings to the creative problem solving domain, we expect
that the larger the choice set of initial resources given to people during problem
solving, the more likely they are to be overwhelmed due to the increased number
of possible combinations involving the given resources. Thus, giving people more
choice during creative problem solving may not necessarily lead to more cre-
ative outcomes. In fact, the marginal increase in the choice set of initial resources
need not even be large for this effect to occur. This is because every additional
resource to a choice set of resources will have an exponential effect on the
number of possible combinations involving the given resources (assuming that
resources can be combined freely). Hence, in problems that involve choosing
among combinatorial possibilities, even small differences in the number of initial
resources given can have large effects in the size of the problem search space.
So when will more choice lead to more creativity? In this research, we argue that
the two critical boundary conditions are the person factor of prior experience
in the task domain and the situational factor of whether explicit instruction to
be creative is given.
Prior Experience
Research in creativity and innovation has suggested prior experience in a given
task domain to be an important predictor of creative performance (e.g., Martinsen,
1993; Amabile, 1983). For instance, Amabile (1983) argued that possession
of domain relevant skills is an important component of individual creativity.
Domain relevant skills include familiarity with the domain in question, having the
technical skills to work with ideas and objects within the domain, and being knowl-
edgeable about facts, principles, paradigm, and key evaluation criteria that are
important to the domain.
The degree of domain relevant skills one possesses depends on formal and
informal education, and on the individual’s experience in the given domain
(Amabile, 2001). Drawing on this argument, we propose that individuals with
high prior experience in a task domain should be more likely to have the domain
relevant skills to navigate the large search space conferred by a large choice set.
Specifically, past experience would guide them in their search for a solution and
help them avoid unnecessary experimentations. Thus, individuals with high prior
experience in a given task domain are less likely to be overwhelmed when deal-
ing with a large choice set of initial resources.
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Task Instruction
Another important consideration is the presence of explicit instructions to be
creative during problem solving (Katz & Poag, 1979, Chen, Kasof, Himsel,
Dmitrieva, Dong, & Xue, 2005; O’Hara & Sternberg, 2001; Goncola & Staw, 2006).
Past research has found that individuals’ creativity test scores improved when
they were told that they were taking a creativity test2 (e.g., Manske & Davis, 1968;
Harrington, 1975). More recent work by O’Hara and Sternberg (2001) suggests
that, in the context of essay writing, the provision of creativity-specific instruc-
tions could lead to more creative performance. In a similar vein, Shalley (1991)
found that a creativity goal primed an individual’s attention and effort to be cre-
ative. Thus, when people are explicitly instructed to be creative, they will tend to
engage in more exploration and experimentation because the aim is to find a
solution that is not only useful but also novel. This is likely to result in an expan-
sive search strategy of experimenting and attempting different ways of combin-
ing the given resources.
Conversely, when no explicit creativity instruction is given, the aim is to find a
solution that maximizes some criteria that do not necessarily include novelty or
newness as a feature. For instance, people could be given instructions that are
totally unrelated to creativity, e.g., be practical. People could also be given in-
structions that might imply creativity but the creativity element was not explicitly
stated, e.g., to come up with a persuasive product advertisement. In this latter
case, even though creativity might be implied, it was not explicitly expressed.
Thus, people’s effort and motivation may not be geared toward exploring novel
solutions (e.g., an advertisement could be persuasive without being new or novel).
As a result, although people may still engage in considerable search while formu-
lating a solution, the search is likely to be comparatively less expansive because
the emphasis is on the functionality (e.g., get customers persuaded) rather
than both functionality and novelty aspects of the solution. In other words, if not
explicitly instructed to be creative, people will be less concerned about whether
the solution is new or novel, as long as it works well. The less expansive search
strategy used when no explicit creativity task instructions are given does not
take full advantage of the large search space conferred by the large choice set
of initial resources.
In this research, we argue that both conditions of high prior experience and
explicit instructions to be creative must be met for high choice to lead to more
creative performance. Without prior experience, individuals will likely lack the
domain relevant skills to effectively and efficiently navigate the large combinato-
rial search space. Without explicit instructions to be creative, even if individuals
have the domain relevant skills to navigate the search space, they may not be
motivated to expend additional effort and cognitive resources to explore and
experiment with new ideas. It is only when individuals have high prior experience
2 It is debatable whether achieving higher creativity test scores means that one will be more creative in
actual problem solving. It is likely that the enhanced test scores captured attempts to be creative
during the test and may have little to do with actual creative performance.
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in a given task domain and told explicitly to be creative that they would make use
of their domain relevant skills to efficiently and expansively search the large com-
binatorial search space conferred by a large choice set of initial resources. In
sum, we propose a three way interaction such that high choice would lead to
more creative performance only when an individual has high prior experience in
the given task domain and given explicit instructions to be creative.
Hypothesis: Only individuals with high prior experience in the given
task domain and given explicit instructions to be creative will produce
more creative outcomes when given high (versus low) choice in tasks
involving combinatorial search. When individuals have low prior expe-
rience or not given explicit instructions to be creative, they are not likely
to produce more creative outcomes when given high (versus low) choice.
We do not have specific hypotheses regarding the main effects of domain
experience and task instruction because each alone is unlikely to be sufficient to
produce a positive impact on creative outcomes. Just because a person is expe-
rienced in a task domain does not necessarily render him or her more creative.
This is because although experience could guide one in exploring an extensive
search space, it could potentially work in the opposite direction of constraining
one to routine thinking. Explicit instructions to be creative may increase a person’s
effort or attempt to be creative but that does not necessarily translate into actual
creative outcomes. In other words, creativity requires a “perfect storm” of high
choice, high prior experience, and explicit creativity instructions.
Next, we describe two laboratory experiments conducted to test our above
hypothesis. We chose an experimental approach so that we could manipulate the
choice variable and thus draw conclusions about the causality between choice
and creative performance.
STUDY 1
We conducted an experiment using a 2 (low versus high choice) x 2 (non-
creativity versus creativity instruction) x 2 (low versus high prior experience in
task domain) between-subjects design to test our hypothesis. In this study, we
used a gift-wrapping task because it is one that most people can relate to and do
not have to be specially trained before they can do.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 100 students (38% males, mean age 21) from a large east coast
university participated in this study. Students were recruited through flyers posted
in the campus and compensated $8 for their time and effort.
Materials
At the beginning of the task, participants were presented with a set of
gift-wrapping materials consisting of various types of wrapping papers and rib-
bons. A set of five other materials typically unrelated to gift-wrapping namely,
newspaper, kitchen aluminum foil, metal wires, sponge, and cotton twine, were
170
Effects of Experience, Instruction, and Choice on Creativity
also provided. The task was to wrap a square gift box (dimensions: 6 cm x 6 cm
x 2 cm). Stationery such as tape and scissors were also provided.
Procedure
Choice Manipulation. We manipulated choice by varying the number of types
of wrapping papers and ribbons given to the participants. In the high choice con-
dition, we gave participants four types of wrapping paper (different colors) and
six types of ribbon. In the low choice condition, we gave participants two types of
wrapping paper and two types of ribbons. The types of wrapping paper and rib-
bons given in each low choice condition were chosen from the larger set of mate-
rials and counter-balanced. In effect, the high choice condition gave participants
more combinatorial flexibility in wrapping the gift-box than the low choice condi-
tion. The difference in combinatorial flexibility between these two conditions is
exponentially large given that each additional gift-wrapping material could be
used with the existing materials in infinitely many ways.
To keep the overall quantity of materials constant across both conditions, we
also paid attention to the quantity per gift-wrapping material in the low choice
condition. Specifically, since only two types of wrapping paper were given (com-
pared to four in the high choice condition), we gave twice as much of each type.
This keeps the total number of pieces of wrapping paper constant across the
two conditions. Likewise, we gave thrice as much of each type of ribbon, thereby
keeping the total amount of ribbons constant across the two conditions. In
both conditions, equal amounts of each of the five unconventional gift-wrapping
materials were provided.
Task Instruction Manipulation. In the explicit creativity instruction condition,
participants were told that the objective of the task was to come up with as cre-
ative a gift-wrap as they could. In the control condition (non-creativity instruc-
tion), participants were simply told to do their “best” in the gift-wrapping task.
Although a “do your best” instruction in a gift-wrapping context may connote the
need to be creative, the need for novelty is not explicitly expressed. For instance,
in the current task, participants may search for gift-wrap ideas that result in a nice
looking or attractive gift-wrap which may not necessarily be novel or new.
Prior Experience. This variable was assessed using a two-item five-point scale
(1 = strong disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The items were “I often wrap the gifts
that I give to my friends and family myself,” and “I have a lot of experience in gift
wrapping.” The correlation between these two items is 0.58 (M = 3.31, min = 1,
max = 5, SD = 0.99).
At the start of the experiment, the participants were randomly assigned to the
experimental conditions and given a set of materials in a brown envelope. The
materials in the envelope varied according to the choice condition. Instructions
were given on a separate sheet of paper and they varied according to the task
instruction condition. Because all the materials were pre-sealed in the brown
envelopes, the person conducting the experiment was blind to the experimental
conditions. Participants were seated separately and told to complete the task
individually. They could use as much or as little of the materials as they wished,
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with no restriction on how the gift was to be wrapped. We gave the participants up
to 40 minutes to complete the gift-wrapping task. To motivate the participants to
take the task seriously, we told the participants that the creator of the most cre-
ative (or “best” in the control condition) gift-wrap would win a $80 cash prize.
Measures
Dependent variable. The key outcome of interest is creative performance on
the gift-wrapping task. To assess the creativity of a gift wrap, we adopt the Con-
sensual Assessment Technique (Amabile, 1982) in which judges assess creative
performance based on their own subjective definition of creativity. Specifically,
we recruited another 50 participants who did not participate in the prior study to
independently evaluate all the 100 gift wraps in a separate setting, ostensibly
framed as a “gift shopping” study. Recent research by Kaufman, Gentile, & Baer
(2005) suggests that creativity ratings by peers are highly correlated with that of
experts, justifying the use of peer raters.
The participants rated the gift wraps in random order using a nine-point scale
(1: not at all creative, 9: extremely creative). Raters used their own subjective
judgment during the evaluation. This enabled us to derive a consensus creativity
rating for each gift wrap based on the judgment of a relatively large group of
individuals instead of a small number of “experts”. Inter-rater agreement (intraclass
correlation) was found to be 0.94, justifying aggregation of the ratings. The mean
creativity rating of the gift-wraps is 5.31 (min = 2.39, max = 7.44, SD = 0.96). The
average creativity ratings of these 50 raters were later used for analysis.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis
Manipulation checks. To verify the effectiveness of our choice manipulation,
we counted the number of unconventional materials (e.g., newspaper, metal wires,
etc) used in a given gift wrap. The number of unconventional materials being
used should be higher when there is less choice of conventional gift-wrapping
materials available. Indeed, we found that participants given low choice made
use of significantly more unconventional materials (M = 1.37, SD = 0.87) than
those given high choice (M = 1.00, SD = 1.04) [t = 1.95, p = 0.05].
Hypothesis Testing
We first performed a median split on the prior experience variable to divide
subjects into two groups: low versus high prior experience in gift-wrapping. We
then conducted analyses of variance (ANOVA) on creativity rating as the
dependent variable with choice, task instruction, and prior experience as
predictors. ANOVA results and cell means are presented in Table 1A and 1B
respectively. The results indicate a significant three-way interaction among choice,
task instruction, and prior experience [F(1,96) = 6.32; p < 0.05; partial η2 = .06].
Subsequent analyses showed that for participants with high prior experience and
given explicit instruction to be creative, giving them high choice (as opposed
to low choice) resulted in outputs that were judged as more creative [t = 1.73;
p < 0.05; partial η2 = .13]. When either one of these two conditions is not met,
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giving participants high choice did not led to more creative outputs. Within the
high choice condition, creativity rating was higher in the high experience and
creative instruction cell than those in the other cells. Although the difference in
creativity ratings in the high choice/high experience/creative instruction cell and
that in the high choice/low experience/non-creativity instruction cell was not sig-
nificant, the means were in the expected direction. Thus, our hypothesis is, in
general, supported in study 1.
TABLE 1A. ANOVA Results for Prior Experience, Task Instruction, and Choice
on Creativity Rating (n = 100).
(STUDY 1)
Variable and Source df MS F Partial η2
Prior Experiencea 1 0.84 0.94 0.010
Task Instruction b 1 0.08 0.09 0.001
Choice c 1 0.27 0.31 0.003
Prior Experience x Instruction 1 2.16 2.43 0.026
Prior Experience x Choice 1 0.00 0.00 0.000
Instruction x Choice 1 0.30 0.34 0.004
Prior Experience x Instruction x Choice 1 5.61 6.32* 0.064
Error 92 0.89
* p < 0.05
a 1 = high prior experience, 0 = low prior experience
b 1 = creativity instruction, 0 = non-creativity instruction
c 1 = high choice, 0 = low choice
TABLE 1B. Cell Means for Creativity Rating1 of Gift-wraps.
(STUDY 1)
Low Prior Experience High Prior Experience
Non-creativity Creativity Non-creativity Creativity
Instruction Instruction Instruction Instruction
Low Choice 5.07 5.20 5.44 5.20a
(1.36) (0.84) (0.81) (1.13)
High Choice 5.55 4.94c 4.95b 5.90a,b,c
(0.62) (1.11) (0.90) (0.80)
Note: Means sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < 0.05.
The mean creativity rating of all gift-wraps is 5.31 (min = 2.39, max = 7.44,
SD = 0.96).
Numbers in bracket are standard deviations.
1 9-point scale (1: not at all creative, 9: extremely creative)
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STUDY 2
To retest our hypothesis in a different context, we conducted another experi-
ment using the same 2 (low versus high choice) x 2 (non-creativity versus cre-
ativity instruction) x 2 (low versus high prior experience in task domain)
between-subjects design. In this second study, we told the participants that as
part of a marketing study, they were required to generate as many ideas as pos-
sible on how to advertise a new drink product called “Icy Soda.” Participants were
told to write down their ideas in one or two sentences.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 114 students (48% males, mean age 23) from the same east coast
university participated in this study. Students were recruited through flyers posted
in the campus and compensated $8 for their time and effort.
Materials
A short description of the “Icy Soda” drink was provided. Participants were
also given paper and pens to write down their ideas.
Procedure
Choice Manipulation. We manipulated choice by giving participants either
two (low choice) or 10 (high choice) themes from which they can use as starting
point to generate ideas for the advertisement. Specifically, participants were told
that the manufacturers of the drink preferred the given set of themes for their
advertisement but would also consider any other ideas that participants had. Par-
ticipants were further told that they were free to combine themes when generat-
ing ideas. Examples of themes include: — “movies”, “romance”, “sports”, “music”,
and “school.” In the low choice condition, participants were randomly given two
out of the 10 possible themes. All 10 themes were featured in the low choice
condition and counter-balanced.
Task Instruction Manipulation. In the creativity instruction condition, partici-
pants were told that the objective of the task was to come up with as many cre-
ative ideas for the advertisement as they could. In the control condition
(non-creativity instruction), participants were told to create as many “persuasive”
ideas as they could. Although a “persuasive” instruction in an advertising context
may connote the need to be creative, the need for novelty is not explicitly ex-
pressed. For instance, participants could aim for a persuasive advertisement with-
out being overly concerned about its level of novelty.
Prior Experience. This variable was assessed using two items, measured on a
5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The items were “I have
previous experience in designing advertisements” and “I have experience in
marketing.” The correlation between these two items is 0.77 (M = 2.05, min = 1,
max = 5, SD = 1.0).
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At the start of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to the
experimental conditions and given a set of instructions and writing paper in an
envelope. Instructions varied according to the experimental conditions. The per-
son conducting the experiment was blind to these conditions. Participants were
seated separately and told to complete the task individually. We gave the partici-
pants up to 40 minutes to complete the task. To motivate the participants to take
the task seriously, we told the participants that the creator of the most creative
(or “most persuasive” in the non-creativity instruction condition) ideas would
win a $80 cash prize.
Measures
Dependent variable. The key dependent variable is the number of ideas judged
as creative. To derive this measure, we first have four raters independently evalu-
ate every idea generated by the participants. On average, each participant gener-
ated eight ideas, resulting in a total of 1059 ideas. Each idea is evaluated for
creativity on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 4 = to some extent; 7 = to a great
extent). As in study 1, raters used their own judgment and criteria for the creativ-
ity evaluation. The inter-rater agreement (intraclass correlation) among the four
raters is 0.72, justifying aggregation. Hence, we used the ratings of these four
raters to compute an average creativity rating for each idea. We then classified
each idea as either creative (rating of 4 or above, i.e., rated as at least “to some
extent creative”) or uncreative (rating of below 4, i.e., rated as below “to some
extent creative”). Finally, we counted the number of creative ideas (i.e., those
judged as above median in creativity with respect to the total set of ideas gener-
ated) for each participant. The mean number of creative ideas is 4.12 (min = 0,
max = 9, SD = 2.54).
RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis
Manipulation checks. To verify the effectiveness of our choice manipulation,
we counted the number of ideas that involved themes outside those that were
given. Specifically, we asked two raters to independently assess whether a given
idea conforms to the given set of themes. For instance, if a participant was given
the themes of “romance” and “school” but generated an idea about sports, then
this idea was coded as one involving an outside theme. From this, we counted the
number of ideas involving outside themes generated by each participant. The
correlation between the two raters was 0.91, an indication of high inter-relater
reliability. The number of ideas involving outside themes from both raters was
then averaged. Since participants were told that the manufacturer of the soft drink
preferred the given themes, to explore outside themes is an indication that the
given themes were deemed somewhat insufficient. Indeed, we found that partici-
pants given high choice generated significantly less ideas involving outside themes
(M = 3.62, SD = 2.49) than those given low choice (M = 5.46, SD = 2.76) [t = 3.74,
p < 0.01, partial η2 = .11]. This suggests that participants in the high choice condi-
tion have more options at their disposal and thus have less need to explore out-
side themes.
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TABLE 2A. ANOVA Results for Prior Experience, Task Instruction, and Choice
on Number of Creative Idea (n = 114).
(STUDY 2)
Variable and Source df MS F Partial η2
Prior Experiencea 1 0.63 0.11 0.001
Task Instruction b 1 1.10 0.19 0.002
Choice c 1 0.01 0.00 0.000
Prior Experience x Instruction 1 6.76 1.16 0.011
Prior Experience x Choice 1 32.05 5.49* 0.049
Instruction x Choice 1 15.00 2.57 0.024
Prior Experience x Instruction x Choice 1 22.88 3.92* 0.036
Error 106 5.84
* p <= 0.05
a 1 = high prior experience, 0 = low prior experience
b 1 = creativity instruction, 0 = non-creativity instruction
c 1 = high choice, 0 = low choice
TABLE 2B. Cell Means for Number of Creative Ideas.
(STUDY 2)
No Prior Experience Some Prior Experience
Non-creativity Creativity Non-creativity Creativity
Instruction Instruction Instruction Instruction
Low Choice 5.00 4.88 4.17 3.19a
(2.34) (3.23) (2.76) (2.56)
High Choice  4.09d 3.61c  3.60b 6.00a,b,c,d
 (2.26)  (2.45) (2.03) (1.78)
Note: Means sharing the same subscript are significantly different at p < 0.05.
Mean number of creativity ideas across all cells is 4.12 (min = 0, max = 9,
SD = 2.54).
Numbers in bracket are standard deviations.
Hypothesis Testing
As in study 1, we first performed a median split on the prior experience
variable to divide subjects into two groups. Because of the generally low level of
experience (M = 2.05) among our participants in the advertising domain, it was
more appropriate to interpret our results in terms of no versus some experience
in advertising, instead of low versus high prior experience in advertising. We then
conducted analyses of variance (ANOVA) on number of creative ideas as the
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dependent variable with choice, instruction, and prior experience as predictors.
ANOVA results and cell means are presented in Table 2A and 2B respectively.
The results indicate a significant three-way interaction among choice, task
instruction, and prior experience [F(1,106) = 3.92; p = 0.05; partial η2 = .04].
Subsequent analyses showed that for individuals with some prior experience and
given explicit instruction to be creative, giving them high choice (as opposed to
low choice) resulted in more creative ideas [t = 3.46; p < 0.01; partial η2 = .27].
When either one of these two conditions is not met, giving participants high choice
did not led to more creative ideas. Thus, our hypothesis is supported in study 2.
DISCUSSION
Both conventional wisdom and extant research suggest that task flexibility
during problem solving is conducive for human creativity. Through two labora-
tory experiments, we found that giving people high choice of initial resources
during creative problem solving, and hence high combinatorial flexibility, does
not always lead to more creative outcomes. Two boundary conditions appeared
to be critical — prior experience in the given task domain and explicit instruction
to be creative. When either one of these conditions is not met, giving people more
choice of initial resources is not likely to result in more creative outcomes.
Theoretical Implications
This current research has several theoretical implications. First, it highlights
the limits of human cognition in contemplating extensive possibilities. Although
this notion is not new, it is seldom discussed in creativity research. Most creativity
scholars advocate the importance of freedom, flexibility, and autonomy in cre-
ative problem solving without considering that there could be a limit as to how
far people could benefit under these conditions. It is likely that this strategy can
be beneficial for creativity only under certain circumstances. This is because
giving people extensive freedom, flexibility, and autonomy in a task could be
overwhelming, given the expanded search space. Hence, only people with high
prior experience in the task domain and given explicit instructions to be creative
would benefit by effectively and expansively navigating this search space to
arrive at creative solutions.
The current study is, to our knowledge, one of the first which shows that task
flexibility may not always be desirable for creativity. Clearly, while task flexibility,
as embodied by an extensive choice set of initial resources, can be motivating,
too much of it can have potential detrimental effects. For instance, in study 2, we
noticed that in the experiment conditions whereby the prior experience and cre-
ativity instruction requirements were not met, low choice (as opposed to high
choice) seems to lead to more creative ideas (see Table 2B). In study 1, we also
noticed similar patterns, with the exception of the low prior experience and non-
creativity instruction condition. Although these effects are not statistically signifi-
cant, it is possible that high choice not only will not lead to more creative
performance, it could have potential detrimental consequences.
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Practical Implications
Our research also has practical implications for organizations given that choice
is a readily available tool for managers to promote employee creativity. For ex-
ample, our findings highlights to managers the potential pitfalls in the notion that
giving employees more choices in terms of initial resources or ideas would neces-
sarily lead to more creative performance. Specifically, our results suggest that
managers want to pay attention to whom they give more options. If these options
were given to an employee with high prior experience in the given task domain,
one could potentially see the desired results if this employee was also instructed
to be creative. A potentially dangerous situation could arise when a manager
gives an employee with limited prior experience in a domain extensive choice or
latitude when solving a creativity-related problem. Not only will the employee be
not likely to deliver a creative output, he or she might actually perform worse!
In the management literature, there are two main bodies of research that in-
form managers on how to harness creativity at the workplace. The first employs
the situational perspective and advocates the importance of situational factors in
affecting workplace creativity (e.g., Amabile & Conti, 1999, Oldham & Cumming,
1996, Shalley 1991). This body of work suggests that managers can do much to
improve creativity at the work place by creating the right context or environment.
The second stream of research employs the person perspective and advocates
the importance of individual difference such as personality (e.g., Barron &
Harrington,1981; Eysenck, 1993) and cognitive ability (e.g, Guilford, 1959, 1977,
1983; Sternberg & O’Hara,1999). This body of research suggests to managers
that in order to build a creative organization, one must hire the right people through
proper selection and recruitment. Our study reiterates the view that both person
and situational factors have a role in influencing creativity and should be consid-
ered jointly (e.g., Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin,1993; Oldham & Cumming, 1996;
Runco, 2004). For instance, it is not enough to give an experienced employee
extensive choice in problem solving and expect creative performance. Rather,
the experience of the employee needs to be coupled with the right instruction
(i.e., to be creative) in order for high choice to achieve its purported effects.
Limitations and future research
The current research is not without limitations. First, our methodology is
experiment-based using fictitious tasks. Hence, the generalizability of our find-
ings to real-world organizations remains to be ascertained. However, we argue
that our tasks are not completely detached from real-world creative problem solv-
ing. For instance, although the gift-wrapping task is not directly translatable into
organizational settings, it has relevance and parallels in the arts, cultural, and
fashion domains. Our second task on advertising is more marketing oriented
but need not be restricted to the marketing context. Specifically, the second task
involves idea generation and could be extended to many organizational and busi-
ness contexts that involve working with ideas. Nevertheless, future research should
attempt to test our hypothesis in a more realistic organizational setting.
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Second, in both our studies, we gave participants external inducements to per-
form the respective task (chance to win $80). The aim was to motivate partici-
pants to take our tasks seriously. However, various scholars (e.g., Jordan, 1986;
Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ross, 1975) have noted that external reward could undermine
intrinsic motivation, an important predictor of creative performance. Hence, it
would be important to see if our findings would stand if no external rewards were
given. Yet, we also wonder to what extent is creative performance cleanly sepa-
rated from reward in real life settings. At least in the current business/organiza-
tional context, creators are likely to be cognizant of the vast rewards that come
along with highly acclaimed creative performance.
Future research should also further probe other boundary conditions of task
flexibility on creativity. In particular, it would be important to consider the influ-
ence of other individual difference variables besides prior experience (e.g., cogni-
tive ability, personality, creativity relevant skills, and creative self-efficacy). For
example, it is possible that individuals’ level of self-efficacy in creative problem
solving (Tierney & Farmer, 2002) may moderate the effect of task flexibility on
creativity. Perhaps individuals who have high confidence in their creative ability
may not find a large number of combinatorial possibilities overwhelming. Indi-
viduals with high cognitive ability should also be better equipped to deal with a
large combinatorial search space.
Other situational boundary conditions such as time pressure could also play a
role. With enough time, people might be more likely to explore more alternatives
and search more extensively, with the potential result of finding a creative solu-
tion. With too little time, people might settle for a satisficing strategy and avoid
extensive search even though more choice confers a large combinatory search
space. Finally, future research could explore different ways to which choice is
administered. For instance, research could move beyond the mere act of choos-
ing, and examines situations in which the effects of choice could cascade into
other aspects of decision making and problem solving.
Conclusion
In closing, we contemplate the role of choice in creative problem solving. The
traditional paradigm of choice in creativity research (i.e., choice versus lack of
choice) is, in our view, useful but does not fully capture the effects of choice.
According to the Darwinian model of creativity, the extent of choice should also
have a significant impact on creativity. After all, to invent is to choose from a
large pool of combinatorial possibilities. By studying how the extent of choice in
initial resources can influence creative performance, we have expanded current
investigations of the effects of choice on creativity. We also questioned the
well-established knowledge that task flexibility and autonomy is necessarily
conducive to creative performance. Results from the current research suggests
that giving people high combinatorial flexibility through the provision of an
extensive choice set of initial resources is only beneficial for creativity under very
specific circumstances.
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